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HOW PERRIS V. HEXAMER WAS LOST IN THE SHADOW OF BAKER V. SELDEN 
Zvi S. Rosen* 
INTRODUCTION 
As part of this symposium on forgotten cases in intellectual property law, Perris v. Hexamer 
stands out as a case that is equal parts important and forgotten. It is obviously important—it is 
one of a preciously small number of United States Supreme Court decisions on the 
idea/expression dichotomy,1 but it is mostly forgotten in favor of the Court’s decision the 
following year in Baker v. Selden.2 It is equally obscure—Westlaw counts 2,787 citations of 
Baker v. Selden, and 82 of Perris v. Hexamer.3 Yet the subject matter of both decisions is 
surprisingly similar, and these cases tell us far more about the boundaries of copyright law when 
considered in tandem than when either one is considered on its own. This piece will seek to tell 
the story of Perris v. Hexamer—in terms of both the background of the controversy and the 
procedural track of the lawsuit, as well as discussing the decision itself. Following this, two 
questions will be addressed—firstly, why Perris was largely forgotten as a decision about the 
idea/expression dichotomy, and secondly, why the vote among the Justices was different in 
* Zvi S. Rosen is a Visiting Scholar and Professorial Lecturer in Law at the George Washington University 
School of Law, as well as the author of the blog Mostly IP History.  He would like to thank the participants in this 
symposium for their comments, feedback, and encouragement, and especially Shubha Ghosh for acting as a catalyst 
for this project.  Thanks are also due to Corey Mathers for his assistance with the analysis of Supreme Court opinion 
citation rate. 
1 Dale P. Olson, The Uneasy Legacy of Baker v. Selden, 43 S.D. L. REV. 604, 606 (1998). 
2 See, e.g., Edward Samuels, The Idea-Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Law, 56 TENN. L. REV. 321, 464 
(1989). 
3 Citing references to Baker v. Selden, WESTLAW, 
https://1.next.westlaw.com/RelatedInformation/I1dab47e7b65511d9bdd1cfdd544ca3a4/kcCitingReferences.html 
(enter “Baker v. Selden” in search field; select “Baker v. Selden”; follow “citing references” hyperlink); Citing 
references to Perris v. Hexamer, WESTLAW, 
https://1.next.westlaw.com/RelatedInformation/I3eb9bfa1b5bc11d993e6d35cc61aab4a/kcCitingReferences.html 
(enter “Perris v. Hexamer” in search field; select “Perris v. Hexamer”; follow “citing references” hyperlink). 
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Perris than in Baker.  Finally, this piece will argue that Perris v. Hexamer offers insight into the 
scope of copyright protection that continues to be relevant with the major cases of today. 
I. THE CASE 
A series of urban fires in the first half of the nineteenth century spurred insurers to realize 
that mere listings of properties that held fire insurance policies that they had underwritten were 
insufficient tools to adequately assess and manage their risk exposure.4 To this end, in 1850 
William Perris, an English engineer, collaborated with the Jefferson Insurance Co. to produce 
and market a fire map of New York City which would graphically illustrate the fire hazards of 
properties and their adjoining lots.5 George T. Hope, secretary of the Jefferson Insurance Co., led 
a committee of insurance men who devised the standards for color-coding and symbols to be 
used to identify risk factors of particular properties and areas.6 Perris published his work in 1852, 
under the title Maps of the City of New York Surveyed Under the Direction of Insurance 
Companies of the Said City.7 This work was successful, and Perris and his partners would 
successfully publish revised editions of this work until his death in 1863.8 Upon his passing, his 
son William G. Perris succeeded his father in the business of producing and selling insurance 
maps, in partnership with his brother-in-law Henry H. Browne.9 
                                                          
4  DIANE L. OSWALD, FIRE INSURANCE MAPS: THEIR HISTORY AND APPLICATIONS 14 (Alma Maxwell and 
Linda Barclay eds., 1997). 
 
5  Id. at 15; WALTER W. RISTOW, AMERICAN MAPS AND MAPMAKERS 258 (1985). 
 
6  OSWALD, supra note 4, at 16. 
 
7  Id. 
 
8  Id. at 16–17. 
 
9  Transcript of Record at 13, Perris v. Hexamer, 99 U.S. 674 (1879) (No. 357). 
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 The success of the Perris map created a “virtual cartographic gold rush” for engineers 
across the country.10 One of the “most prolific” was Ernest Hexamer, a German immigrant and 
civil engineer who had fled the aftermath of the revolution of 184811 and worked for Perris from 
1852 to 1855.12 Having learned his craft there, in 1857 Hexamer relocated to Philadelphia where, 
along with his partner William Lochner, he commenced production of a series of insurance 
atlases entitled Maps of the City of Philadelphia.13 Under their partnership Lochner is believed to 
have done most of the surveying, while Hexamer (along with his wife) colored, printed, and 
bound the volumes.14 According to Hexamer he remained friendly with the elder Perris until 
Perris’s death in 1863, and in 1862 the elder Perris had even acted as Hexamer’s sales agent in 
New York City.15 Hexamer admitted that these maps used the same symbols, legend, and colors 
to identify risk as used by Perris,16 and asserted that the elder Perris had encouraged him to do 
so.17 As shown in the Appendix, though, the early editions of Hexamer’s maps use a key or 
                                                          
10  OSWALD, supra note 4, at 19. 
 
11  Id.; RISTOW, supra note 5, at 260. 
 
12  OSWALD, supra note 4, at 19. 
 
13  Id. at 20. But see Transcript of Record, supra note 9, at 6 (A third partner, Joseph Dietrich, is also 
mentioned in Hexamer’s answer). 
 
14  OSWALD, supra note 4, at 21. 
 
15  Transcript of Record, supra note 9, at 8. 
 
16  Id. 
 
17  Id. at 19. His exact words were that  
 
[b]efore making this map I called on my friend, William Perris, and told him I intended to make an 
insurance map of Philadelphia. He was very much pleased at hearing it, and suggested to me to use 
the same key as he used, for the convenience of the insurance companies who would use my maps. 





legend that is a literal copy of the legend for early editions of the Perris maps.18 Lochner would 
leave the enterprise in 1860, and when Hexamer released his Insurance Maps of the City of 
Philadelphia in 1872, a revised and expanded version of his earlier work, he was one of the most 
successful regional fire map publishers.19 This revised version substituted a new legend and 
symbols, and although it retained the same colors, assigned different meanings to them.20 
 The immediate chain of events that led the younger Perris et al. to sue Hexamer for use of 
the colors and symbols used by his father are not entirely clear. Hexamer’s answer stated that 
until the summer of 1874, his right to use these colors and symbols had never been questioned, 
but that in “July or August” of 1874 he had received a letter from the younger Perris asserting 
that he was engaging in copyright infringement.21 In December of 1874, the younger Perris, 
along with his brother-in-law and business partner, sister, and mother, sued Hexamer in the U.S. 
Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia.22 The complaint was 
drawn in broad terms, accusing Hexamer of infringement of Perris’s work, without making clear 
that the maps were of different cities.23 However, the facts of the case were never truly at issue— 
Hexamer filed an initial answer and then an amended answer, explaining that his maps were of 
Philadelphia while the Perris maps were of New York city, and asserted that the only copied 
                                                          
18  See infra Part VI and note 167; see also Transcript of Record, supra note 9, at 19. 
 
19  OSWALD, supra note 4, at 21, 23. 
 
20  Transcript of Record, supra note 9, at 9.  
 
21  Id. at 9, 21. A brief news clipping from July 29, 1874 indicates that a William Perris had been seriously 
injured jumping from a window in New York City to avoid a fire the previous day. A Fire, ATLANTA CONST., July 
29, 1874, at 2. One can speculate that the younger Perris may have been unable to work and needed money, but it is 
not provable that this is the same individual. 
 
22  Transcript of Record, supra note 9, at 1–2. 
 
23  See id. at 3. 
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material was the colors and symbols used in both maps.24 This was a slight exaggeration, as 
indicated—in early editions of his maps the legend was a virtually photographic copy from 
Perris’s maps.25  
 Some discovery was conducted in the case, and the depositions were preserved in the 
record.26 The younger Perris and Henry H. Browne were both deposed, for the purpose of 
establishing their title to the work of the elder Perris and to introduce documents to the record.27 
Hexamer’s deposition, referenced above, discussed the circumstances of how he came to use the 
legend created by Perris, and his use of different symbols and colors in more recent versions of 
his insurance maps.28 A number of Philadelphia insurance men were also deposed, and asked 
about the meaning and importance of certain symbols used by both atlases.29 
 The case did not present any real questions of disputed fact—at least regarding his 
original fire maps of Philadelphia, Hexamer admitted that he had used the symbols and colors 
used by Perris, and asserted that he had done so with his encouragement.30 There was no dispute 
that Hexamer’s map was not a complete copy of the Perris maps, since a map of Philadelphia 
cannot be a copy of a map of New York.31 However, the legend in the Hexamer map was copied 
                                                          
24  Id. at 6, 8.  
 
25  See id. at 19. 
 
26 See id. at 14–49. 
  
27  See Transcript of Record, supra note 9, at 9–11. 
 
28  See id. at 19–24. 
 
29  See id. at 24–25, 28–29. 
 
30  Id. at 19. 
 
31  See Perris v. Hexamer, 99 U.S. 674, 676 (1879). 
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essentially verbatim from the Perris map, creating at least some issue of literal copying as well.32 
In October of 1875 the matter was heard by the trial court, whose brief opinion was not 
published, but is reproduced in the Transcript of Record submitted to the United States Supreme 
Court on appeal.33 The court’s opinion was that 
[t]he complainants are the representatives of the author of a map of the city 
of New York, in which he embodied certain useful improvements, of which he is 
alleged to have been the inventor. The defendants had made and published a map 
of the city of Philadelphia, in which like improvements are alleged by the 
complainants to be embodied as to the latter city. 
The author under whom the complainants derive their title never obtained a 
patent for the alleged invention, but obtained a copyright for the map only. Under 
the patent conferring this copyright in the map, they alleged that the defendant's 
map is an infringement of their exclusive right. 
The court is of opinion that the bill cannot be sustained. 
It is dismissed with costs.34 
 
Put another way, the court held that Perris had produced a map, and embodied in that 
map his system for marking and indicating fire risks. However, the suit was only brought on the 
grounds of the copyright in the map Perris created, and that was not a viable ground for the 
lawsuit.35 Copyright in a work does not include the system or idea embodied therein, it only 
protects the expression of that idea.36 The fact that Hexamer had copied the legend verbatim 
from the title page of the Perris map was still insufficient to lead to a finding of infringement.37 
                                                          
32  See Transcript of Record, supra note 9, at 19.  
 
33 Id. at 29. 
  
34  Id. at 30. 
 
35  See id. at 3. 
 
36  17 U.S.C. § 102(a)–(b) (2012). 
 
37  See Perris v. Hexamer, 99 U.S. 674, 676 (1879). 
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 Perris et al. timely appealed to the United States Supreme Court in early 1876.38 
However, it would be almost four years until the case was decided.39 This was not particularly 
unusual—a number of factors led to the four year docket backlog in the court, including the 
rigors of the Justices riding circuit much of the time,40 and the lack of a certiorari system that 
meant the Supreme Court had no ability to control its docket.41 Counsel for Perris asked each 
term following when the case would be heard, but it would not be heard until the October Term 
of 1878.42 However, it is worth noting that not all cases took this long—for instance the three 
cases that would become the Trade-Mark Cases were filed with the Supreme Court in January 
and February of 1879; the cases were consolidated in April of 1879 and argument was heard in 
October of the same year.43 Perris (and indeed Baker v. Selden) did not receive the same priority. 
 In their brief, counsel for Perris et al. argued that the legend of colors and symbols was an 
integral and inseparable part of the copyrighted map, and that it was also copyrightable in and of 
itself.44 Having made this argument, they then contended that although the legend used by 
                                                          
38  Transcript of Record, supra note 9, at 30. 
 
39  See Perris, 99 U.S. at 674. 
 
40  See FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN THE 
FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 78 (1928) (“The Supreme Court’s business would doubtless have kept the Justices in 
Washington and the practice of circuit attendance, as subsequent experience shows, would have become 
atrophied.”). 
 
41  Id. at 77 (“[M]ovement for a comprehensive reorganization of the judicial system made no headway in 
Congress . . . congestion of the dockets became more and more ominous.”); see also Lee Epstein, Jeffrey A. Segal & 
Harold J. Spaeth, The Norm of Consensus on the U.S. Supreme Court, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 362, 364 (2001) (“For 
most of the Court’s history, the justices were obliged to hear many disputes . . . the Court’s docket skyrocketed.”). 
 
42  Letter from Joshua Pusey, to Clerk, U.S. Sup. Ct. (Sept. 25, 1876) (on file with author); Letter from Joshua 
Pusey, to Clerk, U.S. Sup. Ct. (Dec. 3, 1877) (on file with author).  
 
43  Zvi S. Rosen, In Search of the Trade-Mark Cases: The Nascent Treaty Power and the Turbulent Origins of 
Federal Trademark Law, ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 827, 857–60, 866 (2009). 
 
44  Brief for Appellants at 3–7, Perris v. Hexamer, 99 U.S. 674 (1879) (No. 357). 
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Hexamer was not a literal copy of the legend used by Perris, it was substantially and admittedly 
based on the legend from the Perris map, and this was sufficient to be infringement.45 Finally, 
counsel for the appellants did not dispute Hexamer’s testimony, but rather asserted that it did not 
prove a license, and that in any case that license had been terminated.46 
 In response, counsel for Hexamer focused on the argument that the use of common colors 
and symbols could not be copyright infringement.47 The brief for Hexamer opens with a nod to 
what would come to be referred to as fair use, arguing that the Hexamer map did not compete 
with or affect sales for the Perris map.48 Following that, Hexamer’s counsel focused on his 
strongest argument—that Perris was attempting to protect a system or idea with copyright, 
instead of attempting to receive a patent for that system.49 In addition to these arguments, 
Hexamer’s counsel noted that Hexamer’s revised 1872 maps used a different legend, that any 
infringement was de minimis, and that the doctrine of laches precluded the suit, as Hexamer had 
been using the Perris system of colors and symbols since 1857.50  
II. THE DECISION 
Argument in the case was held Tuesday, December 17, 1878, and was concluded the 
following day.51 On February 3, 1879, the Supreme Court issued its decision, and decisively 
                                                          
45  Id. at 12.  
 
46  Id. at 14–15. 
 
47  See Brief for Appellee at 5, Perris, 99 U.S. 674 (No. 357). 
 
48  See id. at 3–4. 
 
49  See id. at 3–5. 
 
50  Id. at 6–9, 11. 
 
51  United States Supreme Court Proceedings of 1878, CHI. L. NEWS, Dec. 21, 1878, at 112. 
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sided with Hexamer.52 The opinion was originally assigned to Justice Clifford, but was 
transferred to Chief Justice Waite.53 The Court’s opinion was fairly short, even for the time, 
measuring about two pages of the United States Reports—less if you remove prefatory matter.54 
After a brief recitation of the facts, the Court addressed the two issues before it—the allegations 
of literal copying of the key, and the allegations of nonliteral copying for use of the colors and 
symbols—in two paragraphs totaling under three hundred words and not a single citation.55 
Although the opinion does not strictly distinguish the legal issues, the first paragraph is 
addressed to the former question, and the second paragraph is generally addressed to the latter 
issue.56 
A. The First Holding: Actionable & De Minimis Copying 
The Court first turned to the question of whether there had been what we now call 
“actionable copying” or ”unlawful appropriation” depending on the Circuit—in this case, 
whether the copying of the key was a sufficient copying to constitute infringement.57 In response 
to this question the Court held that “to infringe [the exclusive right of reproduction] a substantial 
copy of the whole or of a material part must be produced,”58 and thus the copying of the key was 
insufficient to constitute infringement of the Perris maps.59 Given that the two maps “are not 
                                                          
52  Perris, 99 U.S. 674 (1879). 
 
53  Chief Justice Waite, Supreme Court Docket Book, Oct. Term 1878, Perris v. Hexamer, No. 93, at 131 (on 
file with Library of Congress, Morrison R. Waite Papers, Box 32). 
 
54  See Perris, 99 U.S. at 675–76. 
 
55  See id. at 676.  
 
56  See id. 
 
57  Id.; see Laureyssens v. Idea Group, Inc., 964 F.2d 131, 140–41 (1992).  
 
58  Perris, 99 U.S. at 676.  
 
59  Id. at 675–76.  
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only not copies of each other, but they do not convey the same information,”60 there could be no 
finding of infringement.61 In essence, the Court held that because the two maps were of different 
cities and were thus fundamentally different works, the copying of the key was insufficient to 
constitute infringement.62 
The Court did not give a label for this doctrine, but at first this part of the decision was 
cited and applied for by a number of cases following Perris.63 For instance, in Morrison v. 
Pettibone the Court cited this rule from Perris to set aside a jury verdict of infringement and 
order a new trial, holding that “infringement [that] was manifestly intended at any incomplete 
stage, but was not carried out, cannot operate to turn the mere embryo into a copy.”64 Likewise, 
the Ninth Circuit applied Perris, among other cases, in holding that even if, arguendo, Charlie 
Chaplin had read the plaintiff’s book, Against Gray Walls or Lawyer's Dramatic Escapes, and 
incorporated small parts into his film Modern Times, that did not mean that it rose to the level of 
infringement.65 This rule would eventually lead to the doctrine of de minimis copying—that only 
a small amount of copying does not rise to the level of infringement.66 However, Perris itself has 
been rarely recognized as a major source of this doctrine.67  
                                                          
60  Id. at 676. 
 
61  Id. 
 
62  Id.  
 
63  Walter Malins Rose, Notes on U.S. Reports, in 25 CASES ARGUED AND DECIDED IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE UNITED STATES 705 (2d ed. 1901). 
 
64  87 F. 330, 332 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1897). 
 
65  Kustoff v. Chaplin, 120 F.2d 551, 560 (9th Cir. 1941). 
 
66  Ringgold v. Black Entm’t Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 




One interesting omission of the Court was the failure to use the still-new doctrine of fair 
use to resolve the issue of actual copying.68 Many of the early fair use cases were argued by 
counsel for Perris, but it is unclear to what extent the Court considered them.69 A number of 
subsequent decisions would likewise discuss the holding of Perris regarding the substantiality of 
copying required in the context of the fair use doctrine,70 but Perris does not apply the fair use 
analysis from Folsom v. Marsh and subsequent cases, and is not generally recognized today as 
part of the history of the fair use doctrine.71 Nonetheless, given that it has been forcefully argued 
that Folsom v. Marsh itself was much more about the scope of infringement—just like the first 
holding in Perris, it is entirely reasonable to place this holding as being part of the line of 
nineteenth century decisions that led to the doctrine of fair use in the twentieth century.72 Alan 
Latman’s observation of “the partial marriage between the doctrine of fair use and the legal 
                                                          
68  See generally Perris v. Hexamer, 99 U.S. 674 (1879) (discussing the commonality of map legends, but 
failing to mention its fair use). 
 
69  See Brief for Appellants, supra note 44, at 4–7, 9. The syllabus to the Lawyer’s Edition notes that counsel  
 
for the appellants, cited Jollie v. Jacques, 1 Blatchf. 618; Green v. Bishop, 1 Cliff. 199; Drury v. 
Ewing, 1 Bond, 540; Folsom v. Marsh, 2 Story, 100; Emerson v. Davies, 3 id. 768; Gray v. Russell, 
1 id. 11; Story's Executors v. Holcombe, 4 McLean, 309; [and] Daly v. Palmer, 6 Blatchf. 256. 
  
Perris, 99 U.S. at 674. 
 
70  See Toksvig v. Bruce Pub. Co., 181 F.2d 664, 666 (7th Cir. 1950) (citing Perris, 99 U.S. at 676) (“[W]hat 
is fair use depends upon many circumstances. It has generally been construed that an infringement consists in 
copying some substantial or material part of a work.”); see also M. Witmark & Sons v. Pastime Amusement Co., 
298 F. 470, 477 (E.D.S.C. 1924) (citing Perris, 99 U.S. at 676) (“It has been said that in deciding questions of this 
sort the court must look to the nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity and value of the materials 
used, and the degree in which this may prejudice the sale, diminish the profits, or supersede the objects of the 
original work.”), aff'd, 2 F.2d 1020 (4th Cir. 1924). 
 
71  See, e.g., PATRY, supra note 67, at § 10:10.  
 
72  L. Ray Patterson, Folsom v. Marsh and Its Legacy, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 431, 447–48 (1998). 
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maxim de minimis non curat lex” is relevant here—it can be hard to separate the embryonic fair 
use and de minimis doctrines for copyright.73 
The closing line of this first holding, that there had been no copyright infringement 
because there had not only been no copying, but indeed the two works “[did] not convey the 
same information,” is an interesting approach to the copyright infringement analysis, albeit one 
that has not found its way into the case law.74 Interestingly, this has become part of the fair 
dealing analysis in the United Kingdom, where one of the leading cases held that if the copied 
material is “used to convey the same information as the author, for a rival purpose, that may be 
unfair.”75 
B. The Second Holding: Protectibility of Systems and Designations 
 Having addressed the charges of literal copying at issue in this case, the Court then 
turned to whether the symbols and colors used by Perris and reused by Hexamer could be 
protected by copyright, and once again found in the negative.76 On this count the Court held that 
Perris et al. held no exclusive right in “the form of the characters they employ to express their 
ideas.”77 The Court made clear that “it has never been supposed that a simple copyright of the 
map gave the publisher an exclusive right to the use upon other maps of the particular signs and 
                                                          
73 ALAN LATMAN, FAIR USE OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, STUDY NO. 14, COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, STUDIES 
PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS, S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH 
CONG. 30 (Comm. Print 1960); see Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 451 n.34 (1984) 
(quoting id.). 
 
74  Perris, 99 U.S. at 676; see Bullinger v. Mackey, 4 F. Cas. 649, 649–50 (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1879) (No. 2,127) 
(analyzing whether a work conveys the same information in determining infringement); see also W. Publ. Co. v. 
Edward Thompson Co., 169 F. 833, 861, 863 (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1909) (addressing the plaintiff’s argument that 
something cannot be a copy if it is not identical). 
 
75  Hubbard v. Vosper [1972] 2 QB 84 at 94.  
 
76  Perris, 99 U.S. at 676. One difficulty of the Perris opinion is that it never makes this pivot clear—it 
requires knowing the works and briefing to understand that different subject matter is being considered. 
 
77  Id. 
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key which he saw fit to adopt for the purposes of his delineations.”78 The Court thus concluded 
that Hexamer had not engaged in copyright infringement of the plaintiff’s work: “All he ha[d] 
done at any time ha[d] been to use to some extent their system of arbitrary signs and their key.”79 
In other words, the Supreme Court refused to recognize any protection under copyright law for 
the legend, symbols, or color scheme of a map. 
There are two aspects to this holding—a narrower one about the copyrightability of 
headings or symbols for classifying and organizing information, and a broader one about the 
dichotomy between idea and expression.80 As one unpublished decision citing Perris for this 
proposition explained, “[t]he copyright laws are designed to protect the publisher or artist against 
individuals who might seek to copy the production. The idea is not protected.”81 As a general 
statement of the dichotomy between idea and expression, Perris was generally cited in tandem 
with Baker v. Selden, and was usually cited second since Baker was a year later.82 Eventually, 
cases would stop citing Perris, and only cite Baker as the bedrock of the dichotomy between idea 
and expression.83 However, as will be explored in greater detail below, Perris is in some ways a 
                                                          
78  Id. 
 
79  Id. 
 
80  See id. 
 
81  Longgood v. Elliot-Wehner Foundry & Mfg., No. 1881, 1932 WL 27369, at *1 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 14, 1932) 
(citing Perris, 99 U.S. at 676). 
 
82  Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 255 n.1 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Dunham v. 
Gen. Mills, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 152, 154 (D. Mass. 1953); Russell v. Ne. Publ’g Co., 7 F. Supp. 571, 572 (D. Mass. 
1934); Aldrich v. Remington Rand, Inc., 52 F. Supp. 732, 734 (N.D. Tex. 1942); Simms v. Stanton, 75 F. 6, 10 
(C.C.D. Cal. 1896) (“A copyright gives no exclusive property in the ideas of an author. These are public property, 
and any one may use them as such.”). 
 
83  See, e.g., Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 350 (1991).  
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superior vehicle for understanding this dichotomy, since it is not freighted by the patent versus 
copyright distinction that was at issue in Baker.84 
In fact, the omission of the patent/copyright distinction—the concept that patents and 
copyrights represent protections for fundamentally different types of mental creations, is notable 
in the Supreme Court’s decision in Perris, especially since the Circuit Court’s extremely terse 
decision does focus on the fact that Perris had not received a patent for his system of organizing 
and identifying features on his maps.85 Indeed, there is no mention anywhere of the elder Perris 
trying to receive a patent for his use of colors and symbols for his maps, and this makes sense—
it seems highly unlikely such a patent would be granted.86 
In addition to being more broadly about the dichotomy between idea and expression, 
Perris has special applicability to cases about copyright in symbols and colors, and is of course 
directly on point in cases regarding copyrights in map symbols.87 Perris has thus been applied to 
preclude a finding of infringement in cases of similarly arranged charts for false teeth,88 making 
a third-party map of West’s National Reporter System,89 correcting one’s own map with 
reference to a copyrighted map,90 regarding display of an iron railings in catalogs at similar 
                                                          
84  See Perris, 99 U.S. at 676; see also Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103 (1880). 
 
85  Transcript of Record, supra note 9, at 30. 
 
86  See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 
87  See S.S. White Dental Co. v. Sibley, 38 F. 751, 752 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1889); Christianson v. W. Pub. Co., 149 
F.2d 202, 203 (9th Cir. 1945); Chamberlin v. Bekins Van & Storage Co., 23 F.2d 541, 541 (S.D. Cal. 1928); 
Blumcraft of Pittsburgh v. Newman Bros., 246 F. Supp. 987, 989 (S.D. Ohio 1965); Official Aviation Guide Co. v. 
Am. Aviation Assocs., 150 F.2d 173, 175 (7th Cir. 1945); Alexandria Drafting Co. v. Amsterdam, Nos. 95-1987, 
95-6036, 1997 WL 325769, at *7, *9 (E.D. Pa. June 4, 1997) (mem.) (subsequently vacated on June 25, 1998). 
 
88  See S.S. White Dental Co., 38 F. at 752. 
 
89  See Christianson, 149 F.2d at 203–04. 
 
90  See Chamberlin, 23 F.2d at 542–43. 
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angles and lighting,91 keying airline schedules to maps, 92and copying “trap streets” into maps of 
one’s own creation.93 However, almost all of such cases were reported long before the beginning 
of the digital age, and none of these decisions deal with issues of digital copying.94 
Following the lawsuit, both Perris and Hexamer continued making maps of their 
respective cities.95 Perris died in 1887,96 and two years later the Perris Company was absorbed 
by Sanborn, which had become the dominant force in fire insurance maps.97 Hexamer continued 
to publish and revise fire insurance maps until his death in 1905.98 His son C.J. Hexamer 
continued in the business until 1915, until he too sold the business to Sanborn.99 Sanborn has 
continued in this business to this day, advertising 1.2 million fire maps dating back to 1866.100 
III. IN THE SHADOW OF BAKER V. SELDEN  
Although the case had already been pending before the Supreme Court for several years 
before Perris was decided, the following term the Court decided Baker v. Selden, a case about 
whether a book describing an accounting system would prevent the publication of a book 
                                                          
91  See Blumcraft of Pittsburgh, 246 F. Supp. at 989. 
 
92  See Official Aviation Guide Co., 150 F.2d at 175. 
 
93  See Alexandria Drafting Co. v. Amsterdam, Nos. 95-1987, 95-6036, 1997 WL 325769, at *7, *9 (E.D. Pa. 
June 4, 1997) (mem.) (subsequently vacated on June 25, 1998). 
 
94  See S.S. White Dental Co. v. Sibley, 38 F. 751, 751 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1889); Christianson v. W. Pub. Co., 149 
F.2d 202, 203 (9th Cir. 1945); Chamberlin, 23 F.2d at 540; Blumcraft of Pittsburgh, 246 F. Supp. at 987; Official 
Aviation Guide Co., 150 F.2d at 173; Alexandria Drafting Co., 1997 WL 325769, at *1. 
 
95  OSWALD, supra note 4, at 17, 23. 
 
96  Obituary of William G. Perris, N.Y. DAILY TRIB., May 14, 1887, at 5.  
 
97  OSWALD, supra note 4, at 17. 
 
98  Id. at 23. 
 
99  Id. 
 
100  Sanborn Fire Insurance Maps, SANBORN, http://www.sanborn.com/sanborn-fire-insurance-maps/ (last 
visited Oct. 6, 2017). 
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describing a similar accounting system.101 The story of Baker v. Selden has already been told 
elsewhere,102 but a brief recitation of the case and its background is relevant to understanding 
why Baker and not Perris became the dominant case regarding the dichotomy between idea and 
expression. 
A. Baker v. Selden 
Baker v. Selden was a dispute, much like Perris v. Hexamer, between the plaintiff’s heirs 
and the defendant.103 Selden had developed a new system of double-entry bookkeeping for 
government accounting, and had received a copyright for his book of forms that embodied this 
system.104 Selden’s book was mostly made up of forms—Selden printed up a large number of 
copies of these books, but wound up deeply in debt when they failed to sell.105 A few years after 
Selden’s publication, Baker published his own system of double-entry bookkeeping for 
government accounting, with additional innovations making it easier to use, embodied in a 
cheaper volume.106 Baker’s system was a major success, and four years later, in 1871, Selden 
died, leaving his estate deeply in debt with the copyright in his bookkeeping text as its only 
asset.107 The following year Selden’s widow sued Baker for copyright infringement for his 
booking system which incorporated many of the innovations of Selden’s booking system.108 In 
                                                          
101  See Baker v. Seldon, 101 U.S. 99, 99–100 (1880).  
 
102  See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, The Story of Baker v. Selden: Sharpening the Distinction Between Authorship 
and Invention, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES 159, 159–93 (Jane C. Ginsburg & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss 
eds., 2006). 
 
103  See Samuelson, supra note 102, at 162–63; see also Transcript of Record, supra note 9, at 1. 
 
104  Samuelson, supra note 102, at 160. 
 
105  Id. at 161. 
 
106  Id. at 161–62. 
 
107  Id. at 162. 
 
108  Id. at 162–63. 
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1874, the Circuit Court in Ohio ruled in favor of Selden’s widow and found that Baker had 
infringed Selden’s copyright.109The case then went to the United States Supreme Court, where 
both parties were represented by fairly prestigious counsel—Baker was represented by a former 
Governor of Ohio and a former state judge,110 while Selden was represented by a former member 
of Congress from Ohio.111 
Justice Bradley’s decision was issued in January of 1880 and sided firmly with Baker.112 
The Court explained that what was protected by Selden’s copyright was his book, not the system 
embodied in that book, holding that “there is a clear distinction between the book, as such, and 
the art which it is intended to illustrate.”113 The Court then discussed the distinction between 
patents and copyrights, and that the publication of a book in no way protected the system 
embodied in the book.114 Indeed, Pamela Samuelson has argued persuasively that Baker v. 
Selden is really much more about the distinction between patents and copyrights than it is the 
distinction between idea and expression.115 The Court thus held that Baker had not infringed 
                                                          
 
109  Samuelson, supra note 102, at 165–66. No opinion was written by Judge Swing in this case, but the 
appellate record printed by the U.S. Supreme Court contains the ruling of Judge Swing as recorded on the docket. Id. 
See generally Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, No. 95 (indicating that Judge Swing ruled 
on the docket). Interestingly, Judge Swing would express a broad view of the copyright clause of the Constitution 
several years later, in the first case to address the constitutionality of the 1870 Trademark Act. See Duwell v. 
Bohmer, 8 F. Cas. 181, 182–83 (S.D. Ohio 1878) (No. 4213). That same year he was part of a divided court in the 
criminal prosecutions of W. W. Johnson, T.E. McNamara, and N. S. Reeder for trademark infringement, which 
would become one of the three cases that comprised the Trade-Mark Cases, which overruled his decision in Duwell. 
See 100 U.S. 82, 85–86, 91 (1879). 
 
110  Samuelson, supra note 102, at 172–73. 
 
111  Id.; Biography of Milton Southard, BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY U.S. CONGRESS, 
bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=S000688 (last visited Oct. 6, 2017). 
 
112  Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 99, 107 (1880). 
 
113  Id. at 102, 107. 
 
114  Id. at 103. 
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Selden’s copyright, and then further held that books of blank forms were not generally eligible 
for copyright.116 Although the Chief Justice’s docket books indicate that Justices Harlan and 
Clifford voted contrary to the Court’s ultimate ruling, no written dissent was issued, either as a 
result of a vote change to achieve consensus or simply due to the overwhelming workload the 
Court faced at the time.117 By contrast, the vote in Perris was unanimous.118 
B. Baker v. Selden Ascendant 
Counsel for Baker reprinted the entire text of the Court’s recent Perris opinion in the 
final pages of their brief, noting “[h]ow admirably this decision applies to the case at bar.”119 
However, the decision in Baker failed to cite to Perris, for reasons that are unclear.120 
                                                          
115  See Samuelson, supra note 102, at 177 (“Modern readers come to the Baker decision expecting to find in it 
a classic statement of the idea/expression distinction, . . . [t]o come afresh to the Baker decision [one will] . . . 
discern how important the patent/copyright distinction was to the Baker ruling.”). 
 
116  Baker, 101 U.S. at 107. 
 
117  See Chief Justice Waite, Supreme Court Docket Book, Oct. Term 1879, Baker v. Seldon, No. 95, at 126 (on 
file with Library of Congress, Morrison R. Waite Papers, Box 32); see also FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 40, 
at 77. Lee Epstein et al. would disagree. EPSTEIN, supra note 41, at 362–63 (asserting that the subsequent lack of a 
recorded dissent reflects the change of a vote to reflect consensus). 
 
118  See Chief Justice Waite, Supreme Court Docket Book, Oct. Term 1878, Perris v. Hexamer, No. 93, at 131 
(on file with Library of Congress, Morrison R. Waite Papers, Box 32). Although not per se germane to this article, it 
is interesting to note that two other well-known Supreme Court cases on copyright from this era that have generally 
been considered unanimous in fact were not. See Chief Justice Waite, Supreme Court Docket Book, Oct. Term 
1879, Nos. 705, 711, 719, at 55–57 (on file with Library of Congress, Morrison R. Waite Papers, Box 32) 
[hereinafter Docket Book for Trade-Mark Cases]; see also Chief Justice Waite, Supreme Court Docket Book, Oct. 
Term 1883, Burrow-Giles v. Sarony, No. 1071, at 163 (on file with Library of Congress, Morrison R. Waite Papers, 
Box 30) [hereinafter Docket Book for Burrow-Giles]. In the Trade-Mark Cases Justice Clifford would have held the 
1870 Trademark Act constitutional, while in Burrow-Giles v. Sarony, Justice Harlan would have voted that no 
copyright infringement had occurred in the copying of a photograph of Oscar Wilde. See Docket Book for Trade-
Mark Cases, supra, at 55–57; see also Docket Book for Burrow-Giles, supra, at 163. These check marks in a docket 
book pose fascinating counterfactuals, and it is a pity no more information exists on why they disagreed with the 
majority. 
 
119  Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 26, Baker, 101 U.S. 99, No. 95 (“There, as here, the parts were separate. 
Certain parts were claimed to infringe. Other parts of the new maps were very unlike the original, and as to these 
there was no infringement. Still more, there was no infringement as to the parts which were alike.”). 
 
120  See generally Baker, 101 U.S. 99 (citing several English cases, but no United States cases). 
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Regardless, in the early years after these decisions were issued, they were treated as being of 
relatively equal importance.121 For instance, Copinger’s Britain-based treatise on copyright law 
used Perris as the case used for the proposition that “[t]here can be no copyright in a mere plan 
of a work; nor any exclusive property in a general subject or in the particular method of treating 
it,” while Baker was relegated to a footnote.122 However, in the twentieth century Baker began to 
pull away in importance, and as of January 1, 2017, it had been cited in 334 cases, according to 
Westlaw.123 By contrast, Perris has been cited by thirty-seven reported decisions, including only 
once in the twenty-first century and five more times between 1960 and 1999.124 An even starker 
illustration of their differing importance comes from the trial court documents available on 
Westlaw: Baker is cited 448 times up to January 1, 2017,125 while Perris is only cited once.126 
Baker v. Selden “remains an enduring authority for its preeminent role in arbitrating between 
protectable expression and unprotectable ideas in copyrighted works.”127 Perris v. Hexamer has 
become a curio. 
                                                          
121  See, e.g., WALTER ARTHUR COPINGER, LAW OF COPYRIGHT, IN WORKS OF LITERATURE AND ART 41–42 
(4th ed. 1904). 
 
122  Id.  Both Perris and Baker were decided slightly too late to appear in Eaton Drone’s seminal 1879 treatise.  
EATON S. DRONE A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN INTELLECTUAL PRODUCTIONS IN GREAT BRITAIN AND 
THE UNITED STATES, EMBRACING COPYRIGHT IN WORKS OF LITERATURE AND ART, AND PLAYRIGHT IN DRAMATIC 
AND MUSICAL COMPOSITIONS (1979) 
 
123  Citing References to Baker v. Selden, supra note 3. 
 
124  Citing References to Perris v. Hexamer, supra note 3. 
 
125  Citing References to Baker v. Selden, supra note 3. 
 
126  Citing References to Perris v. Hexamer, supra note 3. 
 
127  Olson, supra note 1, at 604. 
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IV. PERRIS AS A FORGOTTEN CASE 
With Perris v. Hexamer essentially forgotten in the twenty-first century, even as its 
contemporary Baker v. Selden remains a central part of the canon, two immediate questions are 
raised—why Perris became a forgotten case, and why we should care. 
A. Why was Perris Forgotten 
Although on examination Perris gives us a powerful vision of copyright for ideas and 
systems, on the surface it is a cursory opinion by a Chief Justice who would die of overwork a 
decade later.128 It does not explain its reasoning, and understanding that both literal copying and 
arguments for protection of a system were involved requires a close reading of the terse 
statement of facts.129 
The most basic reason to think why Perris v. Hexamer is generally forgotten, while Baker 
v. Selden is still widely cited, is simply that Perris is an extremely short opinion by an 
overworked Chief Justice that does not always elaborate as fully on its reasoning as it could, and 
is bereft of citations.130 The opinion of Justice Bradley in Baker v. Selden, on the other hand, is 
approximately five times the length of Perris, and explains its rationale with reference to 
authority.131 A number of studies have found a correlation between opinion length and the 
number of citations that opinion received.132 For instance, in a piece analyzing treatment of 
                                                          
128  Biography of Morrison Waite, HISTORY CENT., http://www.historycentral.com/Bio/rec/MorrisonWaite.html 
(last visited Oct. 6, 2017). 
 
129  See Perris v. Hexamer, 99 U.S. 674, 675 (1879). 
 
130  See Citing References to Baker v. Seldon, supra note 3. See generally Perris, 99 U.S. 674 (a two page 
opinion citing no cases). 
 
131 See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 100–07 (1880). 
  
132 See e.g., Ryan C. Black & James F. Spriggs II, The Most Important (and Best) Supreme Court Opinions 
and Justices, 60 EMORY L.J. 407, 471, 484 (2010). 
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Supreme Court opinions from 1969 to 1985, Ryan C. Black and James F. Spriggs II found that 
an opinion in the seventy-fifth percentile for length received on average fourteen percent more 
citations than an opinion in the twenty-fifth percentile.133 A further study by these authors, 
looking to Supreme Court opinions from 1946 to 2004, found a minor positive correlation 
between length and amount of citation over the first few decades, but that the effect disappeared 
within fifteen years.134 However, the authors of these pieces acknowledge that for the era starting 
in 1953 the median opinion was 4,067 words, while for opinions written before 1886, the median 
was 1,380 words.135 Further, while the Court was issuing over 250 opinions per year in the late 
nineteenth century, it issued only 65 in 2005.136 Thus, the question remains whether the minor 
effect observed by Black and Spriggs is more pronounced for earlier eras of the Supreme Court 
where the Court was churning out many more opinions of more variable significance.  
To answer this question I turned to the Free Law Project, which makes the entire run of 
the United States Reports available freely on CourtListener.com, along with many other more 
recent opinions.137 CourtListener has over four million opinions in its database, with all citations 
between opinions in the database, making analysis comparatively straightforward.138  The entire 
                                                          
133  Ryan C. Black & James F. Spriggs II, An Empirical Analysis of the Length of U.S. Supreme Court 
Opinions, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 621, 676–77 (2008). 
 
134  Ryan C. Black & James F. Spriggs II, The Citation and Depreciation of U.S. Supreme Court Precedent, 10 
J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 325, 351 (2013). 
 
135  An Empirical Analysis of the Length of U.S. Supreme Court Opinions, supra note 133, at 639–40. 
 
136  Id. at 633. 
 
137  Opinions – Supreme Court of the United States, JACOB BURNS LAW LIBRARY RESEARCH GUIDES, 
http://law.gwu.libguides.com/scotus/opinions (last visited Sept. 17, 2017). 
 
138  Frequently Asked Questions, COURTLISTENER, https://www.courtlistener.com/faq/ (last visited Sept. 17, 
2017). CourtListener does have a number of major omissions that result in lower citation counts than one would find 
in Westlaw and Lexis, the most major being lower federal court opinions from before 1925, and Federal District 
Court opinions until much more recently. See DITTAKAVI RAO, A SHORT AND QUICK GUIDE TO NO-COST AND/OR 
LOW-COST LEGAL RESEARCH USING THE INTERNET 19 (2015), 
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library of Supreme Court opinions was analyzed, and four data points were extracted – the year 
the opinion was filed, the word count of the opinion, the number of citations to the opinion, and 
the number of internal citations in the opinion.  The Courtlistener database has some weaknesses 
compared to commercial databases like Westlaw and Lexis, chiefly a lack of coverage of older 
federal and state cases, but these weaknesses should be uniform for all cases of certain periods, 
and serve to highlight relative influence of an opinion in the past 40 years. 
A review of all 29,344 Supreme Court opinions139 shows that for the first quartile of 
opinions in terms of age (the period ending in 1887),140 the correlation between word count and 
rate of citation is statistically significant, although not as significant as it would be for the final 
two quartiles, representing opinions from 1920 forward.141 This study provides substance to the 
intuition that a short opinion like Perris is less likely to become canonical. 
The fact that Perris does not make clear it is about both literal and non-literal copying is 
also perhaps why the decision is not discussed more—without a careful reading of the case it is 
not clear the decision is talking about two different types of alleged copying which require a 
different type of approach.142 Since Perris is about both literal copying of the map legend and the 
allegation that using the same symbols and colors on a map constitutes copying, it actually 




139  Opinions of less than 200 words were excluded from the analysis, since these are almost uniformly not 
substantive. 
140  Quartiles are by number of opinions, not by years. 
141  See Search Results for Supreme Court Opinions Before 1887, COURTLISTENER, 
https://www.courtlistener.com/?type=o&q=&type=o&order_by=score+desc&stat_Precedential=on&filed_before=1
887-12-31 (last visited Oct. 6, 2017); see also Search Results for Supreme Court Opinions After 1920, 
COURTLISTENER, 
https://www.courtlistener.com/?q=&type=o&order_by=citeCount+desc&stat_Precedential=on&filed_after=1919-
12-31 (last visited Oct. 6, 2017).  
 
142  See Perris v. Hexamer, 99 U.S. 674, 675–76 (1878).  
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speaks to two different types of conduct.143However, it is easy to think that its holding about de 
minimis copying is really all it has to say, and that was largely how it was applied outside the 
context of copying of maps, where the second holding would also be applied.144 Indeed, as 
discussed above, there are perilously few reported decisions that apply the broader holding of 
Perris regarding nonliteral copying outside the context of maps. 
Another possibility worth taking seriously is that to interpret Perris as being the equal of 
Baker in terms of its holding is to over-read a short decision which could be easily read as a 
casual dismissal of the plaintiff’s allegations. The Court referenced no authority in Perris, and 
decisions citing no authority are much less likely to be cited in the future.145 Looking at the same 
data from CourtListener, but this time counting the number of citations to authorities in cases, 
the correlation is even stronger in the quartile of cases ending in 1887, although perhaps not to a 
significant degree (the difference is much greater for cases between 1887 and 1920).146 However, 
it is not clear that the difference in authorities and length alone account for the obscurity of 
Perris. 
                                                          
143  See id. at 675. 
 
144  See PATRY, supra note 67, at § 10:10; see also S.S. White Dental Co. v. Sibley, 38 F. 751, 752 (C.C.E.D. 
Pa. 1889). 
 
145  See Olson, supra note 1, at 606. At least one commenter has implied that the obscurity of Perris is due to 
the fact that it “did not cite any authorities for the holding it expressed.” Olson, supra note 1, at 606. 
 
146  See Search Results for Supreme Court Opinions Before 1888, COURTLISTENER, 
https://www.courtlistener.com/?type=o&q=&type=o&order_by=score+desc&stat_Precedential=on&filed_before=1
887-12-31 (last visited Oct. 6, 2017); see also Search Results for Supreme Court Opinions Between 1887 and 1920, 
COURTLISTENER, 
https://www.courtlistener.com/?q=&type=o&order_by=score+desc&stat_Precedential=on&filed_after=1920&filed_
before=1887 (last visited Oct. 6, 2017). 
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B. Perris v. Hexamer v. Baker v. Selden 
Perris and Baker have largely been treated as being about the same question, sometimes 
distilled into the concept of the idea/expression dichotomy.147 However, the facts of the cases are 
distinct in a way that actually makes Perris much more pertinent to modern questions of 
copyright than Baker. In Baker, the Court found that a work was not eligible for copyright to the 
extent it merely represented the embodiment of an abstract system for accounting that might be 
appropriate for a patent, but not for a copyright.148 In Perris, on the other hand, there was no real 
argument about whether the various symbols and colors would be appropriate for a patent at the 
level of the Supreme Court;149 the question was whether copyright protected the use of the same 
colors and symbols for a specific purpose.150 The Court was also faced with the question of 
whether the copying of the legend by Hexamer constituted infringement, a question that was not 
at issue in Baker—the short preamble in the Selden book does not seem to have been copied by 
Baker.151 Put another way, Perris points to a view of the dichotomy between idea and expression 
that is closer to the question of nonliteral copying in the software context than it is to the patent 
versus copyright distinction of Baker v. Selden. 
One situation where Perris is superior to Baker is the arrangement of commands in a 
computer program. For instance, in the First Circuit’s well-known opinion in Lotus Development 
                                                          
147  See Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 255, n.1 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Simms v. 
Stanton, 75 F. 6, 10 (C.C.D. Cal. 1896); Dunham v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 152, 154 (D. Mass. 1953); 
Aldrich v. Remington Rand, Inc., 52 F. Supp. 732, 734 (N.D. Tex. 1942); Russell v. Ne. Publ’g Co., 7 F. Supp. 571, 
572 (D. Mass. 1934). 
 
148  Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 105 (1880).  
 
149  See generally Perris v. Hexamer, 99 U.S. 674 (1878) (discussing only copyright). 
 
150  Perris, 99 U.S. at 675. 
 
151  Compare Perris, 99 U.S. at 675–76 (emphasizing the commonality of map legends), with Baker, 101 U.S. 
at 100–01 (focusing on the plaintiff’s system of book-keeping rather than the preamble of the plaintiff’s book).  
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Corp. v. Borland International, when facing the question of whether the copying of the menus 
from the spreadsheet program “Lotus 1-2-3” into Borland’s spreadsheet application constituted 
copyright infringement, the Court specifically rejected Baker as being a relevant precedent 
despite Borland’s “vigorous” arguments in favor of its applicability.152 However, the Court noted 
that “unlike Selden, Lotus does not claim to have a monopoly over its accounting system,” it 
only claimed “the commands it uses to operate the computer.”153 With Perris, on the other hand, 
the work claimed for copyright was a table of symbols and colors (or, put another way, 
commands), and the use of those symbols in using a creative work for which infringement was 
not claimed (the map itself).154 It is not clear why the Court did not cite Perris, but it likely was 
not even suggested. On appeal of the case to the United States Supreme Court, after succeeding 
under more recent case law in the First Circuit, Borland’s merits brief devoted an entire 
subsection to Baker v. Selden and cited it extensively elsewhere—yet it does not even mention 
Perris v. Hexamer.155 
Perhaps the most direct analogy of Perris in a computer context is a high-stakes case that 
remains ongoing despite several decisions—Oracle v. Google.156 In that case, the copyright issue 
                                                          
152  49 F.3d 807, 813–14 (1st Cir. 1995) (“Borland even supplied th[e] court with a video that, with special 
effects, show[ed] Selden's paper forms ‘melting’ into a computer screen and transforming into Lotus 1-2-3.”). 
 
153  Lotus Dev. Corp., 49 F.3d at 814.  
 
154  See Perris, 99 U.S. at 675.  
 
155  See Brief for Respondent at 56, Lotus, 49 F.3d 807 (No. 93-2003). The Supreme Court affirmed per curiam 
without an opinion. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, 516 U.S. 233, 233 (1996) (per curiam). Among those 
briefs to the Supreme Court, available on Lexis and Westlaw (and thus searchable), the only citation to Perris v. 
Hexamer made to the Supreme Court in a brief in the modern era was by Rural Telephone Service as respondent in 
their case against Feist Publications, where they cited Perris for the proposition that copying phony telephone 
directory entries constituted copying of a substantial amount of the work. Brief for Respondent at 44, Feist Publ’ns. 
v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (No. 89-1909).  
 
156  See Oracle Am. v. Google, 750 F.3d 1339, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2014).  
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was whether the reuse of class names by Google for the Java programming language infringed 
Oracle’s copyright in the original Java programming language, where the evidence showed that 
Google had otherwise written its own version of the programming language from scratch.157 The 
analogy to Perris is straightforward—in both cases there is a class of defined functions (a table 
with definitions of map symbols in Perris),158 which are then used as part of a copyrighted work 
where no infringement is alleged (the programming language in Oracle, and the city maps in 
Perris).159 However, despite the millions upon millions of legal fees and costs spent in this case, 
there is no indication that anyone has cited Perris.160 
V. CONCLUSION: A RESURGENT PERRIS V. HEXAMER IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY? 
In 2013, a lawsuit was brought arguing that Madonna’s hit song Vogue from 1990 
infringed the copyright in the 1983 dance track Love Break by The Salsoul Orchestra—
specifically that a horn hit sampled from the 1983 song lasting roughly one-fifth of a second 
constituted infringement.161 The district court held that the sample was not infringing, and the 
Ninth Circuit affirmed.162 In the Ninth Circuit, the Court relied on Perris v. Hexamer to reject the 
rule in the Bridgeport Music cases that no amount of copying of a sound recording is 
permissible, and thus held that there is a de minimis exception to copyright law even for sound 
                                                          
157  Id. 
 
158  See Perris, 99 U.S. at 675.  
 
159  See Oracle Am., 750 F.3d. at 1348; see also Perris, 99 U.S. at 676.  
 
160  Joe Mullen, Google Twists the Knife, Asks for Sanctions Against Oracle Attorney, ARSTECHNIA (July 4, 
2016, 9:30 AM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2016/07/following-courtroom-win-google-wants-sanctions-
against-oracle-lawyer/ (discussing that Google’s costs in this case alone were $3.9 million, and legal fees were 
presumably several times more than that—and that doesn’t even count Oracle’s fees and costs). 
 
161  VMG Salsoul v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2016).  
 
162  VMG Salsoul, No. CV12-05967BRO(CWx), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184127, at *38 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 
2013), aff’d, 824 F.3d. at 887. 
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recordings.163 This opinion from June 2016 was the first reported citation to Perris since 1978, 
and yet the decision retains its force as a Supreme Court precedent on what is—and is not—
copying.164 
There is no reason why Perris should not undergo a similar resurgence in the area of the 
dichotomy between idea and expression, especially concerning software copyrights. While it has 
only been sporadically cited and mostly involved copying under the 1831 Copyright Act,165 
Perris v. Hexamer offers an approach that is substantially superior to attempting to analogize 
Baker v. Selden to increasingly inapposite factual and legal situations. 
APPENDIX: THE MAPS AND LEGENDS 
The Perris and Hexamer maps are available in multiple places online, most notably 
through the New York Public Library and Free Library of Philadelphia, respectively.166 Since the 
litigation was focused in part on the copying of the legends from the maps, I have included 
reproductions of the keys at issue below: 
                                                          
163  VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 880–81. 
 
164  See Citing References to Perris v. Hexamer, supra note 3. It isn’t clear where the citation to Perris came 
from aside from research by the Court or its clerks. The brief for Madonna does not mention Perris. See Brief for 
Appellee at v–vi, VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d 871 (No. 2:12-CV-05967BRO). 
 
165  See, e.g., Munson v. City of N.Y., 3 F. 338, 338 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1880) (citing Perris and addressing a patent 
dispute from a patent issued 1867). The claims under the revised Hexamer legend from 1872 would be covered by 
the 1870 Act. See Act of July 8, 1870, Ch. 230, §§ 87–88, 90, 16 Stat. 198, 212–13 (1870). 
 
166  Search for Perris and Hexamer Maps, N.Y. PUB. LIBRARY DIG. COLLECTION, 
https://digitalcollections.nypl.org/ (search “Perris Maps” in search bar); Search for Perris and Hexamer Maps, FREE 





                                                          
167  This is the legend from the title page of the 1855 Maps of the City of New York First, Second, Third, & 
Fourth Ward, by William Perris, which Ernest Hexamer would have worked on. William Perris, Maps of the City of 
New York: Volume 2 Index Map (on file with The N.Y. Pub. Library Digital Collections), 





                                                          
168  This is the legend from Maps of the City of Philadelphia, published in 1860 by Hexamer and Lochner, 
available at https://libwww.freelibrary.org/digital/item/MHXLBH00001. It is an obvious copy of the legend from 
the Perris map with a listing for three-story buildings awkwardly added on the top right. Subsequent editions of the 
Hexamer maps utilized a modified version of this system, and have a key on each plate instead of one key at the 
beginning of the volume, eliminating a claim of direct copying and limiting the issue to one of copying the system. 
 
